RESOLUTION NUMBER:  23  Approved

SOURCE:    COMMITTEE ON SWINE

SUBJECT MATTER:   Policy Regarding Restocking Requirements and Eligibility for Indemnity of Premises in a Control Area During an African Swine Fever Outbreak

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Policy development during a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak is difficult. It requires valuable time and input from many stakeholders. It is imperative that producers and state and federal regulatory officials work together prior to an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak and do as much planning as possible.

Recent policy was implemented by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) during the 2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak that required a premises in the buffer zone to submit a biosecurity plan and have a virtual audit performed by either a state or federal regulatory official to be eligible for indemnity if the premises subsequently became infected with HPAI. Premises in the infected zone were not eligible for indemnity from USDA-APHIS-VS if the state allowed restocking.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests that the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services define African swine fever (ASF) response policy regarding restocking of premises in control zones, specifically the infected and buffer zones, and for any control areas established by the detection of ASF in feral pigs (which will have extended control area times) and determine prior to an ASF outbreak what policies will be applied.

USDA APHIS INTERIM RESPONSE:

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) recognizes the concerns of the United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) and appreciates the opportunity to respond.

APHIS anticipates several areas of focus for continued discussion around ASF Control Areas. First, any Control Area established by a feral pig only ASF detection will likely be
in existence for an extended length of time, due to the time it will take for wildlife biologists to perform swine surveillance, trapping, and depopulation in the Control Area (and Surveillance Zone around the Control Area). Domestic swine premises located in such a Control Area will have variable risk for ASF infection depending upon the density of feral pigs, and the domestic swine production type (backyard versus indoors swine premises).

Second, Control Areas established by a domestic pig ASF detection are at risk of transmission by direct contact with the virus. Without any direct experience with an ASF outbreak in the United States, the risk of disease transmission within the geographical Control Area is unknown. Primary measures to contain an outbreak will focus on initial quarantine, site biosecurity, and vigorous contact tracing, because the ASF virus is transmitted to swine only through close contact (not aerosol transmission).

APHIS, USAHA Swine Committee, and stakeholders will continue to further evaluate scenarios and biosecurity requirements for restocking and eligibility for indemnity of premises in a Control Area.