
RESOLUTION NUMBER: 1 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON ONE HEALTH**

SUBJECT MATTER: **Increased Fiscal Year 2024 Funding for the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Wildlife Services National Rabies Management Program and Request the Development of an Oral Rabies Bait/Vaccine Bank**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Wildlife Services (WS), National Rabies Management Program (NRMP) has demonstrated that strategic implementation of cooperative oral rabies vaccination (ORV) programs targeting wildlife are cost-effective in reducing rabies transmission to protect human and animal health and reduce the cost of living with rabies. The World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) determined that the most effective strategy to control terrestrial rabies targets the sources of infection (i.e., wildlife vector populations) with landscape scale control efforts. ORV programs are designed to immunize target wildlife species by increasing the percentage of rabies-immune animals within vaccination zones, resulting in the reduction of rabies cases, prevention of viral spread (Phase 1 goal of the NRMP), and eventual raccoon rabies variant elimination (Phase 2 goal of the NRMP).

A comprehensive raccoon rabies management strategy has been cooperatively developed with federal, state, provincial and local partners for the elimination of the raccoon rabies variant in the United States (US) and Canada. In fiscal year 2021, the NRMP and cooperators distributed >9 million ORV baits in 16 Eastern Regional states to combat raccoon rabies and >1.1 million in Texas to prevent the reemergence of canine rabies in coyotes and grey fox rabies along the border with Mexico. The NRMP continues to make progress towards raccoon rabies elimination by removal of a Virginia ORV zone where raccoon rabies has been eliminated and by adding new zones in Alabama to prevent movement into western Mississippi. Another new ORV zone was added in eastern Lake Ontario of New York where raccoon rabies has been enzootic. To date, there were no new NRMP initiated contingency actions in 2020 or 2021. The Canadian Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick remain free of raccoon and red fox rabies.

The existing national supply chain problems are causing concern for the NRMP to meet the needs of licensed bait/vaccine units for ORV distribution. There are two companies manufacturing vaccines and the units are made to order but the shelf life is only 18 months. The important annual ORV distribution is time sensitive depending on the geographic

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location-- Maine to Alabama for raccoon rabies and Texas for canine rabies in coyotes and grey fox rabies. Timing for newborns to be successfully vaccinated is critical. Emergency distribution in ORV sensitive areas can occur at any time of the year. Thus, an oral rabies bait/vaccine bank is required to eliminate any lapse in the ORV schedule.

Successful ORV programs in Texas continue with rabies elimination in gray foxes and maintenance of an immune barrier along the Mexican border to keep the US free of canine rabies in coyotes and gray fox rabies.

The NRMP has been level funded since 2018. The requested total funding of 35 million dollars will allow USDA to:

- Continue the enhanced rabies surveillance program including support of a Wildlife Services biologist conducting between 5,000-7,000 field rabies tests each year (8% of all rabies testing in the US).
- Implement contingency actions in response to rabid animals in sensitive areas.
- Continue Phase 1 of the NRMP, to maintain existing ORV programs to control rabies and prevent spread in wildlife populations.
- Continue the evaluation of novel and US-licensed vaccines and baits.
- Continue studies related to rabies control in skunks, mongoose, and vampire bats.
- Initiate and enhance the operations of Phase 2 of the NRMP to eliminate the raccoon rabies variant in the US
- Plan and implement a rabies bait/vaccine bank (similar in nature to the North American Foot and Mouth Disease vaccine bank) for the purpose of stockpiling oral rabies vaccines for annual and/or emergency ORV use.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests the 118th Congress to appropriate a minimum of \$35 million for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Wildlife Services (WS), National Rabies Management Program (NRMP) and requests that USDA-APHIS-WS initiate the development of a critically needed oral rabies bait/vaccine bank for the NRMP.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 2

Approved as Amended

SOURCE: Committee on One Health

SUBJECT MATTER: Recent Announcement to Declare Salmonella as an Adulterant in Breaded and Stuffed Raw Chicken Products (Press Release No. 0167.22)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has announced that it will be declaring Salmonella an adulterant in breaded and stuffed raw chicken products. We question what, if any, impact this declaration will have on improving public health.

There are more than 2500 different serotypes of Salmonella with different degrees of virulence and pathogenicity, many of which are not fully understood at this time. Declaring Salmonella as adulterant may sound tough, when in reality the implications of such an action would bring about unnecessary economic burden to producers, processors, and also potentially disrupt the supply of poultry products which could lead to increased food costs to consumers. USDA-FSIS should refrain from declaring Salmonella an adulterant of stuffed raw chicken products because this action is unwarranted and unlikely to result in measurable reductions in the national salmonellosis incidence.

While the scope of this action is currently limited to breaded and stuffed raw chicken products, the definition of adulterant implies it is the addition of a substance to a product which is not naturally occurring. To the contrary, the poultry industry goes to great lengths applying practices and interventions to reduce the incidence of *Salmonella* spp in poultry at all levels both pre-harvest and post-harvest of the production chain. Further, the poultry industry carefully constructs and confirms cooking instructions so consumers know how to prepare the specific poultry item.

The range of potential sources of Salmonella is ubiquitous and includes various animal species, such as pets and mail-order poultry, as well as food products like vegetables, fruits, and meat.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests that the United States Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service make scientific, data-driven decisions for new Salmonella policies.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 3 **Approved**

SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

SUBJECT MATTER: Allow Integration of Accredited Veterinarian Data from the National Veterinary Accreditation Program System to State Animal Health Office Database Systems

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Most state animal health officials (SAHOs) have electronic database systems for managing animal health information, including certificates of veterinary inspection, accession, and vaccination records, and other registration, licensing, and surveillance program records that require accredited veterinarian involvement and/or signature. SAHOs must identify and verify the accreditation status of submitting veterinarians. Furthermore, state offices must have a reliable list of accredited veterinarians to contact for important state regulatory and disease updates.

Although SAHOs are granted access to the National Veterinary Accreditation Program system, there is no convenient way to integrate that data electronically into their database systems. Therefore, many states keep a separate data set within their own systems for veterinary data management. This process is duplicative, creating unnecessary data entry and management work as well as decreased accuracy.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests that the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services provide access to data from the National Veterinary Accreditation Program system in real-time for state animal health officials and their electronic database systems that would support system-to-system integration. Accessible data should include full name, address, contact information (email, phone), and accreditation status information (national accreditation number, Level I or II, states accredited in, and expiration date).

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 4 Combined with 29

Approved as Amended

SOURCE:

**COMMITTEE ON POULTRY AND OTHER AVIAN SPECIES
COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL HEALTH AND TRADE**

SUBJECT MATTER:

United States Compartmentalization Program Recognition

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) is the federal government's poultry disease control program administered in cooperation with state animal health officials and poultry producers. The program "Compartmentalization for Protection Against Avian Influenza and/or Newcastle Disease in Primary Poultry Breeding Companies in the United States of America" (NPIP Compartmentalization) was approved by the NPIP in 2014. Poultry primary breeding companies in the United States (US) rely on the ability to export to maintain a steady global supply of breeding stock and account for over 50% of global market share for each egg-type and meat-type chicken and turkey breeders.

Compartmentalization recognition by trading partners would allow for an uninterrupted supply of breeding stock internationally even in the event of outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza. Such recognition is achieved by bilateral agreements.

From the adoption of the NPIP to August 2022, only Indonesia has recognized such programs for the importation of breeding stock of poultry from the US, while Hong Kong only accepts compartmentalization for transit purposes but not importation. No other country thus far recognizes the NPIP program.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to officially engage in bilateral negotiations to establish recognition and acceptance of the National Poultry Improvement Plan compartmentalization program with our trading partners for the continuation of international trade in the event of another highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak in the United States. The USAHA recommends negotiations be initiated through official communications from USDA-APHIS-VS' Chief Veterinary Officer, to their counterparts in key trading partner countries, such as the United Kingdom, European Union, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 5

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON POULTRY AND OTHER AVIAN SPECIES

SUBJECT MATTER:

Telehealth and Virtual Reality Acceptance for Poultry Inspections

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

With increasing innovative technologies that allow for excellent visualization of birds/flocks, adopting acceptance of virtual reality and video technologies to perform official poultry flock inspections would improve biosecurity (making it possible to inspect multiple premises without breaching biosecurity policies in place) and sustainability (by reducing transit times and their implications) and would extend the reach of the veterinary community already experiencing a shortage of resources. This technology is effective and reliable in daily life applications and in specific and specialty fields such as human and veterinary telemedicine; however, the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services, Veterinary Services seems hesitant to officially adopt and accept its use in routine veterinary activities.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services to officially permit the use of telehealth through virtual reality and video technology as part of accredited veterinarians' flock inspections for health inspections and export compliance, veterinary medical officers' inspections at import and export ports, and USDA compartmentalization audits.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 6 Combined with 28 Approved

**SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON POULTRY AND OTHER AVIAN SPECIES
COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL ANIMAL HEALTH AND TRADE**

**SUBJECT MATTER: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Compensation and
Indemnification**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The United States has experienced devastating losses due to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in 2022 with over 42 million birds affected to date (9/15/22). While the efforts addressing this animal health crisis have been exemplary by all stakeholders, continuing to ensure swift depopulation, virus elimination and surveillance is vital to lifting official control areas, and allowing continuity of trade from previously restricted areas. After 14 days since depopulation and initial virus elimination activities have been completed on the infected premises, and all required surveillance testing within the control area has been completed, the control area may be released. Delays that affect the speed of depopulation and virus elimination of infected premises increases the length of quarantines and impact the ability of states and/or regions to regain HPAI free status, which can be achieved following a minimum period of 28 days after stamping-out policy of all affected sites when surveillance requirements are met per World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) Article 10.4.28. This, in turn, can prolong trade restrictions. Adopting policies to incentivize virus elimination of affected premises would help keep timeframes to regain freedom status closer to the 28-day timeframe as described in the Terrestrial code of the WOAH in order to minimize trade restrictions related to HPAI incidents.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services to revise highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) response plans to incentivize swift establishment of initial virus elimination dates and disinfection dates for all HPAI positive premises, including backyard and commercial poultry flocks, for the purpose of minimizing disease spread and the impact of trade restrictions.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 7 Combined with 35

Approved as Amended

SOURCE:

**COMMITTEE ON POULTRY AND OTHER AVIAN SPECIES
COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL WELFARE**

SUBJECT MATTER:

Euthanasia and Depopulation

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has a history of looking to the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) for guidance on the euthanasia of animals (AVMA Guidelines for the Euthanasia of Animals, available at <https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Guidelines-on-Euthanasia-2020.pdf>) and the depopulation of animals (AVMA Guidelines for the Depopulation of Animals, available at <https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/resources/AVMA-Guidelines-for-the-Depopulation-of-Animals.pdf>). However, during the 2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreak, individuals trained to properly euthanize individual birds after application of a depopulation method were asked to not use an AVMA-approved euthanasia method by USDA. This created an inconsistency in the application of AVMA guidelines.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests that the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service consistently accept the application of the American Veterinary Medical Association Humane Endings Guidelines documents (Slaughter, Euthanasia, and Depopulation) when conducting emergency response efforts in livestock and poultry.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 8

Approved

**SOURCE:
SPECIES**

COMMITTEE ON POULTRY AND OTHER AVIAN

SUBJECT MATTER:

**World Organization for Animal Health Definition of
“Poultry”**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The intent of defining “poultry” and “non-poultry” is to specify the classes of birds that are at risk to enter into international/export markets. There have been multiple cases where birds infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza have impacted trade even though they represent no risk of entering an export market. This resolution refines the definition of “poultry” to prevent inclusion of birds that are not at risk to enter international trade.

Currently, the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) defines “poultry” to mean “all birds reared or kept in captivity for the production of any commercial animal products or for breeding for this purpose, fighting cocks used for any purpose, and all birds used for restocking supplies of game or for breeding for this purpose, until they are released from captivity.” This definition of “poultry” caused export disruption of chicken and turkey products from the state of Texas after hunting preserve pheasants were diagnosed and reported as infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza.

There have also been multiple cases of birds being classified as “poultry” when the owners have given away small numbers of eggs to friends or neighbors. This is because the definition uses the wording “the products of which are used primarily within the same household *exclusively*”

United States (US) representatives to WOAH have proposed alternative wording to exclude this class of fowl from the definition of “poultry”. The US has one vote at WOAH and must garner support from other countries to obtain majority to attain a change, and so US poultry producers should be united in this endeavor.

The United States Animal Health Association should lend support to the proposed definition of “poultry” as follows, with edits to the current WOAH definition of “poultry”.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association supports the proposed changes to the definition of “poultry” by the United States representative to the World Organization for Animal Health.

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POULTRY

means all birds reared or kept in captivity for the production of any commercial animal products or for breeding for this purpose, and fighting cocks used for any purpose, ~~and all birds used for restocking supplies of game or for breeding for this purpose, until they are released from captivity.~~

Birds that are kept in a single household, the products of which are used primarily within the same household ~~exclusively~~, are not considered *poultry*, provided that they have no direct or indirect contact with *poultry* or *poultry* facilities.

Birds that are kept in captivity for other reasons, including those that are kept for shows, racing, exhibitions, zoological collections, ~~and competitions,~~ and companionship, pet birds, birds specifically raised for release, and for breeding or selling for these purposes, ~~as well as pet birds,~~ are not considered *poultry*, provided that they have no direct or indirect contact with *poultry* or *poultry* facilities.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 9

Approved

SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON POULTRY AND OTHER AVIAN SPECIES

SUBJECT MATTER: Egg Drop Syndrome Epizootiology

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Egg drop syndrome (EDS) became established as a problem in Pennsylvania in 2018 with 7 confirmed cases to date. In Indiana, 52 cases have emerged since August 30, 2021, in a highly dense, two-county cage free layer area. In Michigan, a broiler breeder farm in southern Michigan became infected in September of 2022. Over 800,000 layers were depopulated in an effort to eradicate the disease, but this effort failed as unvaccinated replacement pullets, moved to previously positive houses, broke with the disease again. White egg layers are also being reported as being infected and starting to show signs of poor production.

The chicken layer industry is fearful that this virus may be spread to other states or other areas in affected states due to the lack of knowledge of the proper techniques to prevent spread such as on egg handling materials, bird movement vehicles, etc. Eggs are moved widely in the industry on reused egg handling materials onto farms where the birds reside providing a risk of movement of EDS virus into flocks. Vaccines are not available in the United States (US) for routine use, so all egg laying chickens in the US are fully susceptible.

This EDS Atadenovirus is not easily isolated with our only tool for surveillance being the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test or serology. PCR can detect either live or dead virus so using this means of evaluating cleaning and disinfection is not meaningful if a positive PCR result is obtained.

Specifically, the following are needs as viewed by veterinarians involved with this problem:

- A reproducible means of isolating the virus to aid in studies on virus elimination using cleaning and disinfection, effect of heat, effect of composting, stability in the environment, etc.
- Better knowledge of the effectiveness of decontamination of egg handling materials that are reused and sent onto farms – plastic flats, pallets
- Identify reservoirs of the EDS virus that may include wild birds, white egg layers, and ducks (domestic or wild)
 - Wide surveillance by PCR or serology would be helpful to determine these reservoirs.
- Identify vectors involved with spread of the disease such as insects, people, wild birds, or others

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- Effective procedures for decontaminating EDS positive poultry houses

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges Congress to allocate additional funds for the United States Department of Agriculture to continue researching the epizootiology of the egg drop syndrome virus to help prevent the further spread and strategies to eradicate the virus in the United States egg industry.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 10

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON FOOD AND FEED SAFETY

SUBJECT MATTER:

Clarification on Limitations to Government Feed Import Risk Mitigation

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

In 2020, Resolution #3 and #12 (Feed Import Restrictions to Protect Against African Swine Fever Importation in Feed) was passed requesting that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services to collaborate with other government agencies to restrict the import of feed/and or feed components from countries that are positive for African swine fever (ASF) to create enforceable standards with those countries to reduce contamination during harvest and processing. An interim response was received pointing out the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was the point of contact, that the request included all feed ingredients rather than just soy and soy products, and that the secondary impacts were too prohibitive if all feed ingredients were banned from import, although supporting details were not given. The interim response supported volunteer programs rather than government-imposed programs, even though voluntary programs have no oversight. No final response has been posted on the United States Animal Health Association resolutions page as of September 2022.

Experimental studies on the ability of contaminated feed, particularly soy and soy products, to transmit diseases including *Senecavirus A* (SVA), porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus, porcine epidemic diarrhea virus, pseudorabies virus, classical swine fever virus, ASF virus, foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) have been done by Kansas State University, Cornell University, University of Minnesota, the USDA-Agricultural Research Service, Pipestone Applied Research, and others (Dee et al, 2014; Dee et al, 2018, Dee et al, 2021; Caserta et al, 2022; Dee et al, 2022; Stenfeldt et al, 2022). This work has been published broadly in peer-reviewed literature culminating in a special issue of feed risk in the January 2022 issue of *Transboundary and Emerging Diseases*. In this issue and in other recent published work it has been shown that time/temperature quarantine reduces risk of transmission from contaminated feed (Dee et al, 2022a) and contaminated feed causes widespread contamination of feed mills (Elijah et al, 2021). Finally, evidence of a SVA transmission into a previously negative country from contaminated feed was published (Dee et al, 2022b).

The risk of feed is well-recognized globally. The Canadian government undertook a collaborative effort to evaluate the cost and benefit of creating risk mitigation steps for feed

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imports and has since implemented a program to reduce risk from imported feed (Calvin et al, 2022). Denmark included a requirement in its Industry Products Standards to heat treat feed from ASF virus infected countries in Asia starting in July 2020 and they require import from only approved companies that are certified to meet quality standards (Agriculture and Food Sector, 2021). Australia defines imported animal feed as a high biosecurity risk on their Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry website, specifically highlighting the import risk to livestock as FMDV and poultry diseases. Australia also has guidelines for importing bulk grain from low risk areas and requirements on how the grain is grown, harvested, stored and transported (<https://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity-trade/import/goods/plant-products/stockfeed-supplements>, Accessed August 31, 2022). The European Food Safety Agency Panel on Animal Health and Welfare has also recognized feed as risk for introduction and spread and that the risk was moderated by the source of the feed (2021). The USDA conducted a qualitative assessment and determined that feed risk ranged from negligible to moderate with high uncertainty (USDA APHIS VS CEAH, 2019). Another qualitative assessment determined the introduction of ASF via contaminated feed was moderate overall (Jones et al, 2020). Qualitative assessments are limited in their clarity and ability to assess risk designations, and quantitative measures are also limited due to varying methods of diagnostic analysis and limited laboratories testing feed (Shurson et al, 2022).

Mitigation of risk of foreign animal disease introduction requires engagement by both industry and government. To date, the US swine industry has acknowledged this threat and participated in research to evaluate feed risk, feed mitigants, and time/temperature controls. The feed import industry has also developed a responsible imports program; one example is SAM nutrition in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Efforts are also needed from the USDA and FDA like what is seen in Australia and Canada. The US government has not widely shared with members of the swine industry details about the challenges with managing risk to feed imports or what the costs would be; clarity is needed. This lack of understanding as to why action cannot be taken is despite industry participation in the Feed Risk Task Force, a letter sent to then Secretary Purdue from the National Pork Producers Council and 30 states, and the 2020 resolution.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) requests the United States Food and Drug Administration, the United States Department of Agriculture and United States Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection provide a report to the USAHA Food and Feed Safety Committee by the 2023 USAHA meeting that includes a clear summary as to what industries and/or stakeholders would be impacted by a risk mitigation program on imported soy and soy products from countries that are positive for foot and mouth disease virus, classical swine fever virus, and African swine fever virus, and how those countries would be impacted. The report should also include an assessment of the impact of the Canadian, Danish, and Australian feed risk mitigation programs and

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identification of components that would mitigate risk for imports into the United States. Assessments should include cost, benefits, and needs for implementation (resources, authority, etc). Comments on how the Foreign Supplier Verification Program could be leveraged to prevent adulteration of animal feed with pathogens as is done for human pathogens should also be included.

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RESOLUTION NUMBER: 11

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT MATTER:

Strengthening the United States Animal Disease and Traceability and Disease Prevention Radio-Frequency Identification Infrastructure

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The threat of a foreign animal disease impacting the United States (US) protein market is real and tangible, recently evidenced by the outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza and ongoing concern for African swine fever. A robust disease traceability system and corresponding action from states and their partners is critical to the US response in protecting our food supply, as well as domestic and export markets. While states have taken steps to improve their ability to detect and trace animal diseases, there are still significant gaps in the overall infrastructure. With a production value well over \$100 billion, providing tools and resources to the states to protect the livestock industry is a top priority.

The United States Animal Health Association has advocated for funding and resources needed to maintain a robust state and federal animal health infrastructure necessary to facilitate early detection, surveillance, response, and control activities to prevent and mitigate domestic and foreign animal diseases.

Increased funding would allow further development of radio-frequency identification infrastructure at the state level and enhance the overall US animal disease traceability system. States would be able to utilize existing Animal Disease Traceability (ADT) cooperative agreements, which are familiar platforms, to focus funding requests to meet their individual needs.

The ADT cooperative agreements establish strong standards to ensure interoperability across all participants and protection of the data collection and utilization process. While the ADT cooperative agreement program is already established, states will continue engagement with key partners within their state, including auction markets, livestock producers and processing facilities to facilitate their participation.

A strong disease traceability system is an insurance plan for our livestock industry but also assures American consumers and global trading partners that the US has a safe and sustainable food supply.

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United States Animal Health Association

2022 Resolution

126th Annual Meeting

Oct. 6-12, 2022

Minneapolis, MN

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests Congress and the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services to increase funding for states to facilitate the build-out of critical Animal Disease Traceability radio-frequency identification infrastructure.



RESOLUTION NUMBER: 12

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON AQUACULTURE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Comprehensive Aquaculture Health Program Standards

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The United States Animal Health Association applauds the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services for working with the National Aquaculture Association to develop the new National Aquaculture Health Plan and Standards (NAHP&S) which incorporates and operationalizes critical components needed to support Comprehensive Aquaculture Health Program Standards. A strong national plan protects all aquatic animal health and provides a national framework for consistent inspection and testing of aquatic animals cultured in the United States, supports international trade and private and public aquaculture, and protects natural resources. The effectiveness and success of NAHP&S requires the cooperation of the aquaculture farming community and state, tribal and federal entities.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) strongly urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to initiate the rulemaking process to codify the Comprehensive Aquaculture Health Program Standards in the Code of Federal Regulations as a voluntary aquatic animal livestock health management plan. Further, USAHA strongly encourages USDA-APHIS-VS to partner with other federal agencies, states, tribes, accredited veterinarians, and laboratories conducting inspections and testing to ensure consistency within the program by developing training programs.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 13

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON AQUACULTURE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Import Health Requirements for Live Aquatic Animals

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

At present, there are only United States (US) federal import health requirements for the importation of live salmonid species and their gametes (United States Fish and Wildlife Service), as well as eight cyprinid species considered susceptible to spring viremia of carp virus and four tilapia species considered susceptible to tilapia lake virus (United States Department of Agriculture). All other live aquatic animals enter the US with no federal animal health requirements. In recent years, detections of World Organization for Animal Health listed pathogens and other emerging pathogens, such as red sea bream iridovirus, infectious hypodermal and hematopoietic necrosis virus, and tilapia lake virus, have been linked to unregulated imports. The introduction of these pathogens causes livestock losses, facility quarantines, export bans, and the need for enhanced surveillance. Import controls would not be intended to ban trade but to ensure that aquatic animals entering the US are healthy and do not pose risks to domestic aquaculture production or natural resources.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to act proactively to prevent the introduction of foreign aquatic animal pathogens that pose threats to the health of aquatic livestock and natural resources through untested live animal and product imports. As such, USAHA requests USDA-APHIS-VS initiate work to zone the United States (US) as free from World Organization of Animal Health (WOAH) listed pathogens that have never been detected in the US, such as salmon alphavirus, epizootic hematopoietic necrosis virus, yellowhead virus-1, and *Perkinsus olseni*. Further, USAHA requests USDA-APHIS-VS immediately impose import controls for those pathogens from which the US demonstrates absence, following the WOAH guidelines to demonstrate freedom.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 14 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON EQUINE**

SUBJECT MATTER: **Advancing Equine Diagnostics at the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, National Veterinary Service Laboratory**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS), National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) plays a critical role in protecting equine health in the United States (US) through timely reporting of results from validated diagnostic tests for equids tested at import or those tested during an epidemiologic equine disease investigation.

The foreign animal disease testing performed by USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL is critical to minimize the risk of introduction or spread of equine diseases such as dourine, glanders, contagious equine metritis and equine piroplasmiasis (EP). Science has shown the impact of stress and transport on the equine immune system can infrequently cause a non-specific immune response and trigger a non-negative diagnostic test result. Additionally, the import disease testing methods utilized in the US have recognized limitations, which result in the non-negative test result classification. Between 2011 and 2021, USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL diagnostic testing results have identified 20 non-negative glanders testing imported equids and 24 non-negative dourine testing imported equids. Regardless of the reason for the non-negative test result, equids with the non-negative classification are quarantined for an extended period of time, until a negative test result is obtained. There is great impact on the health and wellbeing of the individual non-negative equids while in quarantine; especially if it is a fit performance or breeding horse.

The current gold standard of culturing for the diagnosis of contagious equine metritis poses challenges to timely release of equids from quarantine. Although *Taylorella (T.) equigenitalis* colonies are typically visible 72 hours after plating of a positive sample, in some situations it may take up to a week for colonies to appear. Thus, tests are not confirmed negative until day 7. International research has shown, a rapid, robust confirmatory test, such as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test, that does not have as stringent sample transport requirements as when submitting swabs for culture, would be highly beneficial to state animal health officials and diagnosticians. A validated PCR test would be a more economical, quicker means of screening stallions for the carrier state than

[continued]

conventional culture. The PCR assay for *T. equigenitalis* requires additional research to ensure that it is fully validated for the determination of the status of stallions, mares and geldings based on screening swabs and perhaps other

USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL has advanced the diagnostic testing capabilities for equine piroplasmiasis over the years to enable the identification of acute recent infection and chronic infection. However, the identification of EP-positive horses has increased the need to identify the genotypic strains of organisms in positive EP equids detected in the US. While years of surveillance has shown that natural, endemic transmission of EP is not currently known to be occurring in the US, a small number of EP positive horses are found every year in two main high-risk groups: 1) Quarter Horse racehorses infected by iatrogenic transmission, many with ties to unsanctioned racing, and 2) horses illegally moved into the US from EP-endemic countries via Mexico. Strain-typing of EP organisms in these cases would identify and confirm epidemiological links between cases to be detected. Currently, however, there is no validated method to determine different strains of each EP organism (*Theileria equi* and *Babesia caballi*) complicating the epidemiological and trace back investigations.

Thus, advances in diagnostic testing for equine foreign animal diseases at the USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL is essential to protecting and promoting the health of the nation's equine population.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS), National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) to devote the resources necessary to further pursue advancing the diagnostic tests for dourine and glanders. Furthermore, USAHA urges USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL to continue to pursue the development and validation of the polymerase chain reaction test for contagious equine metritis and the genotyping capabilities for equine piroplasmiasis organisms.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 15

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON EQUINE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Contagious Equine Metritis Test Result Reporting

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

During post-import quarantine for contagious equine metritis (CEM), complement fixation (CF) testing is required for all imported mares and test mares bred to imported stallions. The CEM CF testing of test mares is the last step in the quarantine procedures for imported stallions, and receipt of official CF results is often the last requirement for the release of imported stallions from quarantine.

Beginning in 2021, the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, National Veterinary Services Laboratory began releasing unofficial preliminary results, watermarked as "Preliminary Results" to CEM facility owners at their request. These preliminary results are released manually by laboratory staff directly to facility owners, and the inclusion of state animal health officials (SAHOs) has been inconsistent, leading to regulated facilities having access to results prior to the regulatory officials responsible for oversight of the quarantine process, as well as results being sent by regulated facilities to SAHOs outside of normal channels.

In some instances, preliminary release of results has led to pressure on SAHOs to release stallion quarantines prior to their receipt of official CF results. The release of preliminary results has also been inconsistent among facilities and SAHOs, leading to differences among facilities in different states, based on how SAHOs release quarantines on imported horses. Only official complete results should be utilized for quarantine release, thus making preliminary negative results unnecessary.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, National Veterinary Services Laboratory to only release test results required during post-import quarantine for contagious equine metritis in their final format, through official release channels.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 16

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON EQUINE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Contagious Equine Metritis Training

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The success or failure of the Contagious Equine Metritis (CEM) Import Quarantine Program is solely dependent on proper implementation of the prescribed quarantine, animal management and testing procedures by state/federal animal health officials in the CEM-approved states. Proper implementation is achievable only if knowledgeable, technically trained and qualified individuals provide day-to-day regulatory program oversight.

Previously, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services provided the critical in-person training course necessary for designated states CEM coordinators. The hands-on component provided essential training on the proper sample collection and treatment techniques required by the United States Code of Federal Regulations. This is the only training course which ensures clinical competency of those overseeing the CEM programs in the states. With the increased number of newly appointed CEM coordinators across the country, there is an immediate need for the training courses to be resumed.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to provide at a minimum in-person hands-on training for contagious equine metritis (CEM) state coordinators every two years and develop an introductory training module for orienting new CEM coordinators. Furthermore, USAHA urges USDA-APHIS-VS to require that the state-designated CEM coordinator complete the introductory training module within the first year of position appointment and attend the in-person training at the first available opportunity. Such training requirements shall be incorporated into the state-federal CEM Memorandum of Understanding.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 17 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON EQUINE**

SUBJECT MATTER: **Equine Issues Workshop**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Early in 2010, Dr. John Clifford, the Deputy Administrator of Veterinary Services (VS) in the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Jay Hickey, President of the American Horse Council, agreed to co-host a workshop on equine infectious disease control and prevention. The invitation for this meeting in 2010 stated “The emergence of a major equine infectious disease can have dramatic consequences for the horse industry. Such outbreaks have occurred with some frequency over the last several years. These outbreaks have impacted many individuals and groups involved with the equine industry and have also required USDA-APHIS-VS and state animal health officials to spend a great deal of money and staff time to identify the diseases, trace the horses potentially affected, and contain the disease.”

Looking back over the last 12 years, while much has been accomplished, there continues to be an increase of equine disease outbreaks that have required a regulatory response including the 2011 multi-state equine herpesvirus myeloencephalopathy outbreak and marked increase in the detection of horses dually infected with equine piroplasmiasis and equine infectious anemia in the United States due to iatrogenic transmission of the causative agents. State and federal animal health officials, academia and various equine stakeholders have undertaken many initiatives regarding equine infectious diseases and biosecurity over the last ten years. Despite these excellent actions, there has been limited collaboration and communications regarding these efforts amongst these groups. Bringing all entities together for a workshop for strategic planning on efforts to protect the United States equine herd from infectious diseases would be extremely beneficial to advancing equine health

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) and American Horse Council (AHC) to co-host an in-person equine issues workshop in 2023/2024 for state animal health officials, federal animal health officials, equine-focused academic subject matter experts and equine industry organization representatives. USAHA further requests that USDA-APHIS-VS provide financial and personnel resources for the workshop and AHC provide administrative assistance.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 18

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON EQUINE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Federal Authorities to Take Action on Unsanctioned Horse Racing

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Since 2008, at least 382 cases of equine infectious anemia and 532 cases of equine piroplasmiasis have been confirmed in racing Quarter Horses, most with epidemiological links to unsanctioned racing. State and federal animal health officials and equine industry groups have been challenged to rectify the problems observed in this segment of the industry including the personal safety risks associated with entering these venues. The problems are clearly articulated in the August 6, 2022, Washington Post Article by Gus Garcia-Roberts, titled "A horse track with no rules. On-track drug injections, shock devices and a dead jockey: A "bush track" in Georgia is one of dozens that profit outside the reach of regulation." (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2022/08/05/bush-track-horse-racing-georgia/>)

The illegal activities identified, and in some cases, pictorially evidenced include illegal gambling, racing, and selling of drugs, inappropriate carcass disposal, administration and use of narcotics in humans and animals, and mistreatment of the horses. State animal health officials would benefit from a response by federal entities with authorities over these and other identified criminal activities.

Additionally, implementation and enforcement of federal-level regulations prohibiting unsanctioned horse racing would protect and promote equine health in the United States.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) urges the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services to collaborate with state and other federal authorities to address the health and welfare of equine in unsanctioned racing as well as illegal activities associated with the events.

Furthermore, USAHA urges equine industry stakeholders such as the American Horse Council, the American Quarter Horse Association, and the American Association of Equine Practitioners to pursue federal legislation to prohibit unsanctioned equine racing.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 19

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON EQUINE

SUBJECT MATTER:

National Animal Health Monitoring System Equine Study

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) program unit conducts national studies on the health and management of United States domestic livestock and poultry populations. These studies are designed to meet the information needs of the industries associated with these commodities, as identified by people within those industries. NAHMS equine studies conducted in 1998, 2005 and 2015 provided extremely beneficial data and analysis to the equine industry and state animal health officials (SAHOs).

The equine industry has recognized an increasing number of equine domestic infectious disease outbreaks (strangles, equine herpesvirus, equine influenza, and arboviruses) and the increasing risk for incursion of foreign animal diseases such as equine piroplasmiasis, contagious equine metritis, and African horse sickness. The equine industry believes the recent change in equine demographics, equine health care, interstate and international movement patterns and biosecurity practices could have an impact on future disease prevention and control efforts. Therefore, industry and SAHOs recognize the critical need for a new NAHMS study to be conducted to define these changes and potential impacts.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) urges the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services to devote the resources necessary so that the National Animal Health Monitoring System can conduct an equine study within the next 5 years. Furthermore, USAHA requests state, federal and industry stakeholder participation in study needs assessment, study design and implementation.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 20 Approved

SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON SWINE

SUBJECT MATTER: African Swine Fever 72-Hour National Movement Standstill

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The current draft United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) African swine fever (ASF) 72-Hour National Movement Standstill requirements are copied below.

“For a period of 72 hours, effective [XXX xx, XXXX, XX:00 a./p.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time, the intrastate and interstate transportation of the following, from any location in the contiguous United States, is prohibited:

Live swine of any kind (including pets such as miniature pigs or potbellied pigs); Swine semen; or Swine embryos.

All live swine that are in intrastate and interstate commerce at the start of the movement standstill must reach a destination and not be stopped on the road. Livestock in transit refers to livestock loaded in vehicles that have departed the point of loading, or held in a livestock market.

Swine arriving to slaughter establishments may be slaughtered provided they pass Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) antemortem inspection.

Live swine in transport to Canada will not be permitted to cross the border and should return to point of origin.

Germplasm swine semen and embryos in interstate commerce must reach a destination. Interstate commerce of FSIS-inspected pork and pork products is not affected.

Producers and transporters who disregard this order may be subject to civil penalties and may have additional requirements (hold order, quarantine, permitting or other restrictions for movement of pigs) placed on their premises by State or Federal animal health officials.”

One of the key aspects of the standstill order is to stop further spread of ASF while attempting to find additional cases. It is important to continually review the requirements of the standstill order.

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Swine semen and swine embryos (germplasm) originates in the most bio-secure facilities within the swine industry. A movement standstill on germplasm will result in negative production consequences that are not offset by decreased risk of ASF spread. The University of Minnesota is currently finalizing a risk assessment that demonstrates the risk status of boar studs.

Removal of dead stock from a facility is a critical element that can spread disease from site to site. Since ASF can cause mortality and remains viable in dead tissue, removing dead stock from one facility and moving it to another greatly increases the risk of spreading ASF. In the United States, feral swine are sedentary, non-migratory wild animals that live within established geographical home ranges. As such, detection of ASF in feral swine will have local transmission risk versus a national threat. In addition, feral swine are not part of normal swine production systems or networks.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) recommends the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) consider the following policy changes to the USDA-APHIS-VS African swine fever (ASF) 72-Hour National Movement Standstill:

- Remove swine semen and swine embryos (swine germplasm) from National Movement Standstill requirements.
- Add the prohibition of deadstock movement off premises to the requirements.
- Remove a detection of ASF in feral swine as a trigger for a National Movement Standstill; rather, address a detection in feral swine only with establishment of a control area or appropriate geographic zone.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 21 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON SWINE**

SUBJECT MATTER: **African Swine Fever Hour 73: Planning Options for Resumption of Movement following 72-hour National Movement Standstill**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

In any one day, the swine industry moves over a million pigs. If African swine fever (ASF) was introduced into this scenario, it could be distributed across the United States in a very short period of time. Upon the initial introduction of ASF, the current policy is to institute a 72-hour standstill order.

The 72-hour standstill is intended to accomplish several goals:

- Stop movements to slow any further spread of disease.
- Allow producers and other entities involved with production, time to address biosecurity and if any changes are needed after movement resumes.
- Allow regulatory officials time to do epidemiological tracing on the infected premises and identify the appropriate control areas to establish when the 72-hour standstill expires.

It is also understood that a standstill order will create other consequences. The COVID-19 pandemic provided the lesson that we can stop movement, but it must be resumed as soon as possible to not create a significant cascade of negative impacts on swine production sites.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association recommends the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services adopt the following policy changes to minimize negative consequences of the 72-hour National Movement Standstill.

Hour 73 Swine Slaughter Establishments in Free Areas

After the 72-hour National Movement Standstill, at Hour 73, slaughter establishments in the Free Area should be removed from any extended national standstill order and be allowed to resume operations.

Hour 73 Scenarios for Production Premises (*dependent upon circumstances of the outbreak*)

- Continue National Movement Standstill for an additional period beyond hour 73 exempting swine movement to slaughter establishments in free areas.
- End the 72-hour National Movement Standstill at Hour 73.

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- Premises in free areas resume intrastate and interstate commerce at Hour 73 without permits unless movement is into an established control area.
 - Premises in established control areas need permits for intrastate and interstate commerce.
 - Establish a smaller geographical or jurisdictional movement standstill area (such as part of a state, or an entire state, or a region) for intrastate and/or interstate commerce at Hour 73.
 - Premises in free areas resume intrastate and interstate commerce at Hour 73 without permits unless movement is into an established control area.
 - Premises in established control areas need permits for intrastate and interstate commerce.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 22 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON SWINE**

SUBJECT MATTER: **Request for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to Define When Authorization of Indemnity for Depopulation will be Approved by USDA-APHIS-VS During a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak that Involves African Swine Fever**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Policy development during a foreign animal disease outbreak is difficult. It will require time and input from many stakeholders. During an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak, it is critical to detect and respond quickly to cases of ASF.

Confirmation of cases by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) is critical to safeguard against a false positive and responding inappropriately. It is important for USDA-APHIS-VS to confirm the presence of ASF in each state or territory.

Confirmation of cases by USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL does, however, slow down USDA-APHIS-VS authorization of indemnity for depopulation.

Diagnostic testing is conducted at one of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratories approved for ASF testing and confirmed at the USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory/USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL. Confidence in NAHLN comes from the oversight and testing proficiencies required by USDA-APHIS-VS. In addition to NAHLN diagnostic laboratory testing, field responders will provide objective assessments of ASF clinical signs for disease observed during investigations for each affected premises in outbreaks.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) requests that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) adopt the following policy regarding indemnification prior to an outbreak:

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During an African Swine Fever (ASF) outbreak, the USDA-APHIS-VS authorization for indemnity to depopulate the first detected case within a state or territory will require confirmation by the USDA-APHIS-VS National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL). The USDA-APHIS-VS authorization for indemnity to depopulate any subsequent cases in a state or territory will not need to be confirmed by USDA-APHIS-VS-NVSL but will require: 1) ASF non-negative or presumptive positive result at an approved National Animal Health Laboratory Network laboratory, and 2) determination of clinical signs compatible for ASF on the affected premises. Detected cases would include feral and domestic swine.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 23 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON SWINE**

SUBJECT MATTER: **Policy Regarding Restocking Requirements and Eligibility for Indemnity of Premises in a Control Area During an African Swine Fever Outbreak**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Policy development during a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak is difficult. It requires valuable time and input from many stakeholders. It is imperative that producers and state and federal regulatory officials work together prior to an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak and do as much planning as possible.

Recent policy was implemented by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) during the 2022 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak that required a premises in the buffer zone to submit a biosecurity plan and have a virtual audit performed by either a state or federal regulatory official to be eligible for indemnity if the premises subsequently became infected with HPAI. Premises in the infected zone were not eligible for indemnity from USDA-APHIS-VS if the state allowed restocking.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests that the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services define African swine fever (ASF) response policy regarding restocking of premises in control zones, specifically the infected and buffer zones, and for any control areas established by the detection of ASF in feral pigs (which will have extended control area times) and determine prior to an ASF outbreak what policies will be applied.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 24 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON SWINE**

SUBJECT MATTER: **Adopting Draft National Standardized Guidelines for Harvesting Establishments Prior to an African Swine Fever Outbreak**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

It is imperative that producers, state regulatory officials, and federal regulatory officials adopt national standardized guidelines for harvesting establishments prior to an African swine fever outbreak. Specifically, guidelines are needed for harvesting establishments that are infected/contaminated premises, a contact premises, or a premises in a control area.

The draft guidelines for harvesting establishments are available through the Committee on Swine.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services recognize and consider adopting the draft guidelines developed by the Harvesting Establishment Working Group for harvesting establishments.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 25

Approved as Amended

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON SWINE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Depopulation Response Time of an Infected Premises with African Swine Fever

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Depopulation of premises infected with African swine fever is one of the key foundational pieces to controlling the spread of the disease. Delayed response time to depopulation increases the number of animals on the premises that become infected, increases the risk of disease spreading to another site, and increases the amount of virus that needs to be eliminated from the facilities. Recent experiences with highly pathogenic avian influenza support that rapid depopulation is key in slowing the spread of disease.

Depopulation must balance the need to react rapidly, ensuring safety to all involved, and the method of depopulation is selected appropriately. Operational resources and the challenges of depopulation in domestic swine premises must all be considered.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to consider incorporating policy that domestic swine premises infected with African swine fever (ASF) be depopulated as soon as possible with depopulation being completed within 15 days of ASF* detection. The allowance of up to 15 days recognizes that swine premises range in size from a few pigs to tens of thousands of pigs, depopulation needs to be done as humanely as possible with consideration for human health and safety, and legal disposal requirements may require depopulation to be extended.

*ASF detection is defined as part of this policy consideration as either a USDA-APHIS-VS National Veterinary Services Laboratory confirmation of the first infected premises in a state or territory, or a National Animal Health Laboratory Network presumptive positive combined with clinical signs on subsequently infected premises in the same state or territory.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 26

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON SWINE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Establish National Standardized Permitting Guidance for an African Swine Fever Outbreak Prior to the Outbreak

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Developing national standardized permitting requirements during an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak will be difficult to achieve and will take a considerable amount of time. Time at the beginning of an outbreak will be needed to manage the disease response and not develop protocols. It is imperative that producers, state regulatory officials, and federal regulatory officials work together, prior to an ASF outbreak, to establish the core principles of the testing and permitting requirements. It is understood that permitting is done at the state animal health official level and can vary, but it is to all stakeholders' benefit and responsibility to create consistency and transparency.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) requests the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to:

1. Publish specific information regarding testing and permitting for control areas for an African swine fever outbreak on a USDA-APHIS-VS web page.
2. Publish the attached document entitled "Draft African Swine Fever National Standardized Permitting Guidance for Control Areas" on the USDA-APHIS-VS web page.
3. Recognize the USAHA Committee on Swine, or its designated sub-committee, to review, no less than annually, the document titled "Draft African Swine Fever National Standardized Permitting Guidance for Control Areas". The USAHA Committee on Swine, or its designated sub-committee, will consult with individuals with subject matter expertise to update the document.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 27 **Approved**

SOURCE: **COMMITTEE ON SWINE**

SUBJECT MATTER: **United States Department of Agriculture Plan for a Coordinated Response to the First Outbreak of Japanese Encephalitis Virus in Pigs in the United States**

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Since late 2021 and early 2022, Australia has been experiencing an outbreak of Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) infection in pigs and people. Estimates are that there has been an average production loss of approximately 6% of the national herd with some estimates being as high as 10%. Forty confirmed and suspected human cases with six fatalities have been associated with the outbreak.

JEV is a vector-borne disease, spread by *Culex* spp. and potentially other mosquitoes. The reservoir hosts are currently thought to be egrets and other like waterfowl although research to confirm is ongoing. Pigs are an amplifying host of the virus.

The current United States Department of Agriculture FAD PReP document is “Disease Response Strategy - Japanese Encephalitis” and, according to the document, “. . . is intended to provide animal health emergency responders with the information necessary to respond to JE, should it enter the United States. . . as well as control and eradication strategies.” Those control and eradication strategies include stamping out within 24 hours of a premises being identified as infected, trace back and trace forward for at least 42 days, and quarantine and movement controls, among others. All which may be appropriate for animal to animal and fomite spread pathogens but may not be for vector-borne pathogens like JEV. An urgent review of the guidelines presented in the document is needed for response preparation should JEV enter the United States.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association requests the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services to work with industry, state animal health officials, and other stakeholders to review “Disease Response Strategy – Japanese Encephalitis” and update and revise it where appropriate to reflect current science and contemporary global experience with a Japanese encephalitis virus outbreak. This should be completed by March 1, 2023, in preparation for the American Association of Swine Veterinarians 2023 annual meeting.



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RESOLUTION NUMBER: 28 Combined with 6

SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL ANIMAL HEALTH AND TRADE

SUBJECT MATTER: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Compensation and Indemnification



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2022 Resolution

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Minneapolis, MN

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 29 Combined with 4

SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL ANIMAL HEALTH AND TRADE

SUBJECT MATTER: United States Compartmentalization Program Recognition

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 30

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON WILDLIFE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Chronic Wasting Disease Carcass Disposal Dumpster Management and Biosecurity

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

State and tribal wildlife agencies may identify collection points (dumpsters) within an identified chronic wasting disease (CWD) management zone for the disposal of hunter-harvested cervid carcasses to remove potentially infected carcasses off the landscape for disposal by an approved method (Gillin & Mawdsley, 2018, chap.14). However, depending on their placement and maintenance these dumpsters could potentially increase the risk of CWD transmission.

In several different states, photographic evidence has shown dumpsters in state identified CWD management zones overflowing with deer carcasses and limbs scattered on the land nearby. This could provide an opportunity for scavengers to potentially move infected carcass material to non-infected zones or increase contamination of the ground material around the dumpster's location.

Federal guidance does not explicitly address uniform standards for collection locations for carcasses of free-ranging cervids; however, the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services Program Standards on CWD outlines procedures for carcass disposal, equipment sanitation, and decontamination of premises for captive cervid facilities.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies (AFWA), Wildlife Health Committee to further refine the AFWA Technical Report on Best Management Practices for Prevention, Surveillance, and Management of Chronic Wasting Disease; Chapter 14, Carcass Disposal to address the placement and management of chronic wasting disease carcass disposal dumpsters or other carcass collection containers.

Reference:

Gillin, Colin M., and Mawdsley, Jonathan R. (eds.). 2018. AFWA Technical Report on Best Management Practices for Surveillance, Management and Control of Chronic Wasting Disease. Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies, Washington, D. C. 111 pp.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 31

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON FARMED CERVIDAE

SUBJECT MATTER:

Proximity Barriers for Interstate Movement of Farmed Cervidae

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The goal of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) National [CWD Voluntary Herd Certification Program](#), located in (9 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 55 & 81) is to provide a consistent national approach to control the incidence of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in farmed cervids and prevent the interstate spread of CWD. Farmed cervid herds must participate in the program and be certified to move animals interstate.

Some state regulatory officials governing interstate movement are utilizing their own authority to prohibit entry if the herd originates from an area within a specific proximity to a known CWD discovery in the free-ranging herd. Such guidance on proximity exclusions is not included in the CWD Federal Rule or the APHIS Program Standards.

State restrictions are inconsistent with examples showing mileage restrictions of 10 miles, 25 miles or 50 miles from a known CWD diagnosis or a herd's location in relation to the home county, adjacent county or state.

The farmed cervid industry agreed to a federal layer of regulation aimed for consistency but the recent state action wanes the usefulness of the federal rule. Farmed cervid herds with more than twenty years of monitoring status and hundreds of post-mortem CWD non-detected samples are being restricted based on local environment status.

Such interstate movement restrictions are not based on peer-reviewed science that demonstrates specific range impacts of free-ranging discovery of the same cervid in relation to a farmed herd, specific range impacts of free-ranging discovery of a different cervid species in relation to a farmed herd, time elapsed since the free-ranging discovery and impacts to herds residing in double fenced facilities.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges state animal health officials and/or state wildlife officials that govern state import requirements of farmed cervidae to use proximity restrictions based off best available science and the science be made publicly available.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 32

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON CATTLE AND BISON

SUBJECT MATTER:

Standardization of State Cattle and Bison Import Requirements Regarding Brucellosis

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The United States (US) cattle and bison herds met the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) standards to establish freedom from brucellosis (*Brucella abortus*) infection in 2008. The last reservoir for *Brucella abortus* in the US is the elk and wild bison herds in the Greater Yellowstone Area (GYA), where the state borders of Wyoming (WY), Montana (MT), and Idaho (ID) join.

The WY, MT, and ID state animal health officials (SAHOs), state and federal wildlife management agencies, and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) established their respective Designated Surveillance Area for Brucellosis (DSAs) in 2010 based on the distributions of seropositive elk and bison, and those agencies continue to monitor and adjust the DSAs based on known distributions. Implementation of the states' DSA programs involves brucellosis transmission control through temporospatial separation of livestock and wildlife, and robust surveillance measures within their respective DSAs to minimize the risk of brucellosis transmission and rapidly detect and contain the disease when transmission does occur. The USDA-APHIS-VS ruminant health staff critically review each state's DSA activities on a rotating, triennial basis (most recent reviews: WY – 2020, ID – 2021, MT – 2022 in progress).

In 2014, USDA-APHIS-VS, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) released a report of a formal assessment (Portacci et al. 2014) that estimated the risk of brucellosis escape from the combined DSAs to be 0.027 per year (roughly interpretable as an escape expected every 37 years). The USDA-APHIS-VS-CEAH assessment also evaluated the costs and benefits of post-movement requirements and found that the costs of those requirements exceed the costs of outbreak responses near the end of the brucellosis eradication campaign and far exceed the costs of spillover containment responses conducted by ID, MT, and WY.

Currently, 12 states impose additional brucellosis requirements on cattle from parts of or all of ID, MT, and WY. These requirements impose costs and logistical complexities on commerce not justified by risk assessments and cost benefit analyses. To date, all brucellosis detections have demonstrated exposure within DSA boundaries and have been

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detected prior to entry into interstate commerce. Since the inception of the DSAs in 2010, most brucellosis spillover to domestic livestock has been detected prior to shedding by infected animals. Triennial review of state brucellosis programs by USDA-APHIS-VS has failed to find significant deficits.

RESOLUTION:

In the absence of significant program deficits found during the triennial review process, the United States Animal Health Association urges state animal health officials to eliminate state and region-specific brucellosis import requirements for cattle and bison beyond assurance that shipments meet state of origin Designated Surveillance Area requirements.

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 33

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON CATTLE AND BISON

SUBJECT MATTER:

Cattle Contact Tracing System

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

Animal health officials across the United States (US) are tasked with protecting the cattle industry. Animal disease traceability (ADT) is a critical component to mitigating potentially economic significant diseases that could be detrimental to normal business operations. Traces are routinely conducted by animal health officials on cattle to mitigate potential disease spread. Traditional components of ADT have limited animal health officials to effectively perform a quick traceback and subsequent response time. Current ADT tools that are available for animal health officials allow for a limited trace on a current animal forward and backward (bookend tracing). Additional contacts during a trace can be determined throughout the process. However, with the current information flow, these close contacts may take additional time that could hinder a response which could be economically detrimental to the industry in the case of a potential foreign animal disease such as foot and mouth disease.

In early 2018, Kansas cattle producers led an effort that resulted in the CattleTrace pilot project which began work to develop a purpose-built infrastructure to track cattle movement through the supply chain (contact tracing) to collect the minimal data necessary for contact tracing. The data points include an individual animal identification (ID) number, a GPS location, and date and time of the read to track animals in the event of a disease outbreak. Tag readers were located at producers' operations, livestock markets, feed yards and beef processors. The pilot project was a collaborative partnership between the state of Kansas, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and producer stakeholders.

The goal for the pilot project was to:

- Develop a purpose-built infrastructure for a contact traceability system,
- Evaluate the infrastructure,
- Determine the value proposition of the system at each production segment and across the industry.

Simultaneously, multiple other states including Florida, Texas, and Kentucky conducted pilot projects with collaborative funding from USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Project objectives ranged from testing effectiveness of both forms of radio frequency identification (RFID) along with different forms of RFID identification, such as ultra-high frequency backtags.

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In January 2020, these efforts from major beef producing regions announced a partnership to form US CattleTrace, a stand-alone, non-profit organization solely focused on animal disease contact traceability. Today, the goal is to develop a national infrastructure for disease contact traceability used by state and federal animal health officials fed by private industry's use of the infrastructure for individualized management practices. The organization aims to continue pursuing a voluntary, hands-free, speed of commerce contact tracing system. The organization will utilize the most current forms of ID that allow for the animal disease traceability system to operate at the speed of commerce within multiple segments of the cattle industry.

State and federal animal health officials' continued support of RFID tags and collaboration with industry directed at utilization of a contact tracing infrastructure would directly enhance animal disease traceability efforts of cattle on a national level for a quick, accurate and timely response.

Additionally, sharing of existing contact trace data (ID, time, date, location) by individual state and federal animal health officials with contact tracing systems such as US CattleTrace would serve to expand the database size and geography enhancing the effectiveness and accuracy of contact traces.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges state animal health officials and the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services to work with industry to enhance cattle contact tracing efforts for economically significant diseases through collaboration and sharing of current cattle contact traceability data. This data should utilize and grow the cattle contact trace infrastructure in which readers can collect and share the critical datapoints (ID, Time, Date & GPS Location).

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 34

Approved

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AND EMERGING DISEASES

SUBJECT MATTER:

Policy Development Necessary for the Importation and Use of Point of Care Assays

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The 2021 Joint National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) and National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program (NADPRP) funding targeted six projects supporting the development and/or evaluation of point-of-care (POC) diagnostic tests to enhance the nation's ability to quickly detect high-consequence foreign animal diseases (FADs) and accelerate response and containment efforts. POC assays for high-consequence FADs support laboratories in disease outbreak response, however, many of these potentially useful FAD POC assays have been developed for use in other countries but have not been tested or validated for use in the United States. There is a well-defined process in the 9 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 104 for obtaining permits for importation of biological products, including POC diagnostic test kits. This process must "reasonably ensure that the product is pure, safe, potent, and efficacious". This process can be lengthy and expensive. It is not conducive to rapid approval for emergency use. However, 9CFR part 106.1 provides provisions for exemption of those requirements:

"The Administrator may exempt any biological product from one or more of the requirements of this subchapter if he determines that such product will be used by the Department or under the supervision or control of the Department in the prevention, control or eradication of animal diseases in connection with (a) an official USDA program; or (b) an emergency animal disease situation, or (c) a USDA experimental use of the product."

Policies should be developed and implemented to ensure a national framework that quickly allows for importation, evaluation, and use of POC diagnostic assays. Additionally, policies should be in place stating when, where, and by whom POC diagnostics will be used, how results will be reported, and what actions will be taken related to POC diagnostic test results.

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association urges the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to develop and implement policies which enable rapid exemption according

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to 9 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 106.1 of selected point-of-care (POC) assays from the 9 CFR Part 104 requirements for Permits for Biological Products. Policies should also be developed that address when, where, and by whom POC assays would be used, how those performing assays will be trained, and how POC test results will be reported and used.



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RESOLUTION NUMBER: 35 Combined with 7

Approved as Amended

SOURCE:

COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL WELFARE

COMMITTEE ON POULTRY AND OTHER AVIAN SPECIES

SUBJECT MATTER:

Euthanasia and Depopulation
