The Committee met on November 14, 2010 at the Minneapolis Hilton Hotel in Minneapolis, Minn., from 12:30 to 5:30 p.m. There were 22 members and 28 guests present. Dr. Jim Evermann welcomed the attendees and reviewed the agenda.

**U.S. National Reportable Animal Diseases**

Dr. Ellen Kasari, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH), USDA-APHIS-VS

Dr. Kasari presented a draft list of U.S. National Reportable Animal Diseases. She addressed that the list is separated into Notifiable and Monitored Diseases.

**Notifiable diseases** are those that must be brought to the attention of the regulatory authorities within defined timeframes in accordance with national and State regulations.

**Monitored diseases** are those that are routinely tracked and utilized to detect disease occurrence in a given population.

A copy of a resolution originating from the USAHA/AAVLD Committee on Animal Health Surveillance and Information Systems on the subject matter United States National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD) was distributed for review and later discussion.

**NAHMS Report availability of Bovine Viral Diarrhea Section**

Dr. David Dargatz gave a report on the availability of the BVD section of the most recent NAHMS report on the NAHMS website. He also asked that interested person provide input on the upcoming cattle feedlot survey at http://nahms.aphis.usda.gov.

Dr. Evermann gave a report on the BVD Subcommittee and the importance of tracking strain variations. He then introduced Dr. Julia Ridpath.

**Biosecurity and Emerging Viral Pathogens**

Dr. Julia Ridpath, USDA-ARS

Dr. Ridpath focused on the new pestivirus variant, HoBi virus that originated from South American fetal bovine serum originally. Since then the virus has been reported to cause disease in cattle and water buffalo in Asia. This led to a discussion of biosecurity of animal origin products and the potential value of revisiting the 9 CFR. It was agreed to investigate the need for a resolution from this committee for the 2011 meeting. A representative from the National Center for Import/Export will be contacted in this process.

**Cattle Biosecurity I, Cow/Calf and Feedlot: Biosecurity is challenging in Beef cow-calf and feedlot operations.**

Dr. Mike Sanderson, Kansas State University

Beef producers operate in environments that are difficult to secure from outside influence including neighboring herds, wildlife and potentially people with destructive motivations to access and damage the operation.

Cow calf operators commonly import cattle but rarely practice quarantine or testing. Further, vaccination rates are generally low.
The nature of feedlot operations involves the import and rapid turnover of large numbers of cattle making biosecurity practices difficult or impractical. Feedlots are concentrated sites of beef production that may be tempting targets for terrorist actions from groups such as PETA, ELF, ALF or even international groups. Security practices that might mitigate security risks are not commonly practiced by feedlots.

Rational economic implementation of biosecurity and security practices in beef operations must be tailored to each individual operation based on the specific risks and management commitments of the farm. A risk analysis of the potential hazards, probability of the hazards, effectiveness of mitigations and the overall economic value of should be undertaken to assure the economic and biological value of any biosecurity/security program.

**Cattle Biosecurity II, Dairy**
Dr. Dale Moore, Veterinary Extension, Washington State University

Biosecurity or management of biological risks to reduce disease transmission on the dairy has been given much attention in the United States since the FMD outbreak in the UK in 2001 and the threats of agroterrorism after 9-11. Many resources on recommendations for reducing transmission risks exist but relatively few have actually undergone empirical testing for their efficacy. Despite that, many “common sense” approaches have been used to provide veterinarians and producers with ways to minimize both US-endemic diseases as well as trans-boundary diseases. This synopsis of recommendations addresses the risks of bringing diseases onto the farm as well as reducing transmission within the farm premises.

The first and most important place to start with biosecurity recommendations is to **assess the farm-specific risks**. The risky practices are described in the following set of questions that dairy farm advisors can use to help identify those farm-specific risks. The greatest risks for introducing disease have to do with **incoming or purchased cattle**, **testing**, and **quarantine**. The next involves **people** and their **vehicles**. Risks for on farm disease transmission include the **calving pen**, **hospital pen management**, **age group segregation** and **feed contamination**.

**Bison Biosecurity**
Dr. Naomi Taus, USDA-ARS

Dr. Taus reported on the research pertaining to Malignant Catarrhal Fever (MCF)in Bison. She discussed bovine herpes virus II, the most common cause of MCF bison and cattle in the United States and Canada. She compared OvHV -2 in the natural reservoir, domestic sheep, with the pathogenesis in bison. She indicated that the adolescent lambs are the greatest risk for transmitting OvHV-2. She reviewed several steps of biosecurity in dealing with bison. These included good hygiene and avoiding contact between bison and sheep at sales yards. She also described an occurrence that compared the difference in clinical cases of MCF in bison located one, two and three miles away from a lamb feed lot. She also reported on death losses of >50% in exposed bison compared to a death loss in cattle of 0,0025%

**Camelid Biosecurity Farm First Bio-Security™**
Dr. Jeanne Rankin, Assistant State Veterinarian, Montana Department of Livestock

Dr Rankin gave a presentation that focused primarily on llama and alpaca. A critical point of risk was the mobility and frequent comingling of animals from different premises. She listed the following as important points.

1. Have a Bio-Security Plan posted, review it annually and stick to it.
   a. Asses your risks
      i. Animal movement
      ii. Disease risk
      iii. Facilities
      iv. Feed and bedding
      v. Veterinarian
      vi. Human movement
   b. Manage the risks after identification
   c. Communicate the mitigation factors
      i. Signs
      ii. Boot wash
      iii. Employees
iv. Visitors

2. Keep a Closed herd-limit/restrict non-natural additions
3. Isolation pen for sick or purchased animals
4. House common aged animals together-“All in-All out” Cria very susceptible to diseases and many neonatal diseases can be prevented by reducing exposure to older Cria.
5. Reduce stress of crowding by having adequate bunk space, shelter and limiting additions
6. Proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for environment- footwear, coveralls, foot baths, gloves etc.
7. Separate cleaning utensils for sick pen and healthy pens. Different forks for hay versus dung pile
8. Limit visitors from:
   a. small ruminant farms- Dictate fresh change of footwear and clothing before visiting your barn and pens
   b. international visitors from livestock operations- Foreign Animal Diseases
9. Wildlife/Pets Biosecurity
10. Have an Emergency Preparedness/Evacuation Plan

Dr. Evermann noted that each of the presenters focused on a risk assessment as the essential starting point for formulation of a bio-security plan specific to a facility.

Committee Business
The Committee considered proposed resolution mentioned above and voted unanimously to support the resolution from the Committee on Animal Health Surveillance and Information Systems